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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) has been re-
cently introduced as a new communication paradigm in computer
networks. By separating the control plane from the data plane
and entrusting packet forwarding to straightforward switches,
SDN makes it possible to deploy and run networks which are
more flexible to manage and easier to configure. This paper de-
scribes a set of extensions for the INET framework, which allow
researchers and network designers to simulate SDN architectures
and evaluate their performance and security at design time.
Together with performance evaluation and design optimization
of SDN networks, our extensions enable the simulation of SDN-
based anomaly detection and mitigation techniques, as well as the
quantitative evaluation of cyber-physical attacks and their impact
on the network and application. This work is an ongoing research
activity, and we plan to propose it for an official contribution to
the INET framework.
Index Terms—SDN; Security; OMNeT++; INET; Simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, Software Defined Networking (SDN)
[10] has been more and more adopted as a new network
communication paradigm [3]. Unlike the traditional Inter-
net model, SDN separates the actual forwarding of network
packets (data plane) from the management of network traffic
and routes (control plane). In principle, a centralized SDN
controller determines how to handle different traffic segments,
namely flows, and installs related forwarding rules on simple
switch devices responsible for the actual packet forwarding.
The SDN controller and the switches rely on a common set
of APIs and control messages to interact with each other, so
preventing interoperability issues among devices from differ-
ent vendors. To this end, OpenFlow [4] has become the de-
facto protocol implemented in SDN controllers and switches.
By entrusting all the monitoring and decision processes to the
SDN controller, SDN considerably simplifies the management
of large-scale networks. Also, it results in a faster and more
flexible re-configuration of traffic patterns, if compared with
traditional network architectures.
To deploy SDN networks that operate according to ex-
pectations, it is vital that, far before deployment, network
designers can quantitatively evaluate: i) network and commu-
nication performance; ii) effects and impact of security attacks
against the network; and iii) accuracy and effectiveness of
anomaly detection systems [6]. To this end, network simulation
represents a convenient and helpful tool to adopt, since it
can be infeasible to perform the same evaluations in real,
large-scale, networks. Especially for evaluating SDN-based
monitoring systems and the impact of security attacks, it is
convenient to perform such assessments at design time, so not
interfering with the regular operations of real networks. On the
other hand, an analytical approach is often infeasible, unless
oversimplifying assumptions are made.
So far, there have been only a few contributions for simula-
tion of SDN networks. Mininet is a common tool to perform
functional testing of emulated networks based on OpenFlow
[1]. However, it focuses on real-time functional testing rather
than on the simulation and evaluation of arbitrary network
scenarios. The network simulator NS-3 provides an OpenFlow
simulation model [9]. However, the SDN controller is not
modeled as an external entity, and thus it is not possible to
quantitatively evaluate the impact of the control channel or
to consider multiple switches connected to the same SDN
controller. More recently, [2] has proposed the implementation
of OpenFlow components integrated in the INET framework
[5], based on the network simulation environment OMNeT++
[15]. However, it models only the basic flow establishment
between OpenFlow switches and a basic SDN controller. Also,
it implements only flow-matching rules solely based on MAC
address fields.
In this paper, we describe a set of extensions for the INET
framework that enable performance and security evaluation in
SDN networks. In particular, we have extended the model ini-
tially proposed in [2], in order to support additional OpenFlow
messages and enable the processing of network packets based
on flow-matching rules of arbitrary complexity. Also, we have
provided support for SDN-based monitoring systems, accord-
ing to which the SDN controller: i) collects flow statistics from
the connected switches; ii) analyzes collected samples in order
to detect possible anomalies; and iii) possibly determines and
disseminates policies to mitigate anomalies and restore normal
operating conditions in the network. Finally, we have enabled
the simulation of effects of security attacks in SDN network
scenarios. To this end, we consider the INET-based attack
simulation framework SEA++ that we previously described
in [8] and whose functionalities have been adapted to support
attack simulation in SDN networks. Intuitively, the user can
describe different cyber-physical attacks by means of a high-
level attack specification language, without altering the actual
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implementation of any of the INET software components.
Events that reproduce the effects of the described attacks
are injected at runtime during the simulation experiments.
The approach devoted to reproducing and evaluating security
attacks is not strictly related to SDN, i.e. it can in principle
be reused together with any network architecture and scenario
sopported by the INET framework.
We believe that our extended simulation tool allows re-
searchers and network designers to effectively and conve-
niently evaluate SDN architectures at design time, both in
attack-free scenarios and in case different security attacks are
performed. In particular, it makes it possible to evaluate an
SDN scenario in terms of: i) network and communication
performance in an attack-free case; ii) effectiveness and re-
activeness of SDN-based monitoring systems; iii) quantitative
effects of security attacks, as to how attacks affect performance
indicators in the same network scenario; and iv) quantitative
effectiveness of security countermeasures. This work is an
ongoing research activity, and we plan to propose it for an
official contribution to the INET framework. Our extended
simulation framework is currently under development, and the
source code is available at [7].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II overviews
Software Defined Networking. Section III describes our exten-
sions to the INET framework which support SDN, OpenFlow,
SDN-based monitoring systems, and simulation of effects of
security attacks. In Section IV, we evaluate a simple Denial of
Service attack against a server host, and present preliminary
results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and anticipates
future works and research directions.
II. PACKET FORWARDING IN SDN
SDN essentially relies on the separation of data plane and
control plane. In particular, the data plane is entrusted to sim-
ple switches that forward network packets according to stored
flows and related matching rules. The control plane is entrusted
to a centralized SDN controller, which establishes packet flows
and installs them on the switches. The SDN controller and
switches interact with each other through dedicated control
messages and APIs, such as the ones provided by the common
OpenFlow protocol [4].
Figure 1 shows an example of flow establishment and packet
delivery. First, host A sends a packet P to host B (step 1).
Upon receiving packet P, the switch looks for a possible match
between P and the flows installed in its flow table (step 2). If
no matching rule to process packet P is found, the switch asks
the SDN controller for further instructions (step 3). Then, the
SDN controller creates a new flow (step 4), and installs the
related matching rule and actions on the switch (step 5). That
is, it instructs the switch that all packets coming from Port 1,
with IP source address 192.168.0.1 and IP destination address
192.168.0.2 must be sent out over Port 2. After that, the switch
installs the new flow on its flow table, as a pair of matching
fields and actions to be performend on any packet matching
with that flow (step 6). If more output ports are available, the
switch is initially instructed to send out this first packet P over
Fig. 1: Flow establishment and packet forwarding.
all ports different than Port 1. Later on, upon receiving a reply
packet on a specific port, the switch contacts again the SDN
controller, which modifies the action associated to that flow
by specifying the exact outgoing port to consider. Finally, the
switch forwards packet P to host B (step 7).
III. SDN EXTENSIONS FOR INET
This section overviews our extensions for the INET frame-
work. Section III-A presents the support for flow establish-
ment and packet forwarding based on OpenFlow. Section
III-B presents the support for SDN-based monitoring systems.
Section III-C presents the support for the evaluation of se-
curity attacks. Our extended simulation framework is under
development, and the source code is available at [7].
A. Support to SDN architecture and OpenFlow
SDN relies on two fundamental elements: i) the SDN
controller and switches; and ii) the exchange of OpenFlow
messages to establish flows and install them on the switches.
We have considered the model initially proposed in [2], that
provides a number of essential OpenFlow messages and the
implementation of the switches and SDN controller nodes. In
particular, the SDN controller is essentially a host running
an application which relies on a typical TCP/IP stack and
models a specific controller behavior. Instead, the switches
are modelled as a new type of node, where a control plane
running a TCP application on top of a TCP/IP stack interacts
with multiple data plane instances, by means of the OMNeT++
signal concept. Both the SDN controller and the switches rely
on a specific time model to take into account the processing
time of real OpenFlow units.
We extended the model implemented in [2], providing
additional functionalities that enable the evaluation of SDN-
based monitoring systems and impact of security attacks (see
Sections III-B and III-C). In particular, we provided additional
support to: i) exchange and process the OpenFlow control mes-
sages OFPT STATS REQUEST and OFPT STATS REPLY
between the SDN controller and the switches for collection
of flow statistics; ii) exchange and process the OpenFlow
Fig. 2: Overview of a SDN controller and switch.
messages OFPT FLOW REMOVED sent by the switches to
the SDN controller to report expired flows; and iii) allow the
switches to perform the matching of incoming packets with
installed flows based on arbitrary packet fields (rather than on
MAC addresses only).
Figure 2 shows the architectural overview of the SDN
controller (a) and a SDN switch (b). The elements coloured
in red have been extended in our implementation, in order
to enable statistic collection and network monitoring, as well
as the reporting of flow expiration and the arbitrary-complex
matching of packets with flows installed on switches. The
SDN controller is simply modelled as a generic host, running
a traditional TCP/IP stack. Then, a specific Controller appli-
cation is responsible for the establishment of flows, and their
installation, update and revocation on the switches. Of course,
the Controller application can be entrusted with additional ser-
vices, such as network monitoring and anomaly detection (see
Section III-B). Policies, algorithms and parameters according
to which the Controller application behaves are specified in
the Controller behavior module.
The switch is composed of two different segments, sharing
the same Flow table. That is, the Control plane is also
modelled as a typical TPC/IP stack, through which a Flow
processing application can exchange control messages with
the SDN controller. Instead, the Data plane is a set of minimal
communication stacks, each one relying on a dedicated MAC
interface. Then, all MAC interfaces are connected to the
same Forwarding application, which forwards packets from
an incoming MAC interface to an outgoing MAC interface,
according to the flow-matching rules and related forwarding
actions stored in the Flow table. If no matching is produced,
the Forwarding application asks the Flow processing applica-
tion to contact the SDN controller and establish a new flow,
before proceeding.
The following OpenFlow messages are considered in order
to support the establishment and updates of flows.
• OFPT PACKET IN. Sent by the switch to the SDN con-
troller, when a packet is received and no match is produced.
• OFPT PACKET OUT. Sent by the SDN controller to a
switch, specifying to send a packet over a specific interface.
• OFPT FLOW MOD. Sent by the SDN controller to a
switch, specifying to install/modify a flow in its flow table.
• OFPT FLOW REMOVED. Sent by a switch to the SDN
controller, notifying that a flow in the flow table has expired.
B. SDN-based monitoring systems
The SDN controller can run additional application services
to perform security monitoring of the network. This practically
relies on three modules, namely flow statistic collection,
anomaly detection, and anomaly mitigation. That is, the SDN
controller periodically sends an OFPT STATS REQUEST
OpenFlow message to the switches, according to a pre-
configured polling interval. The switches reply with an
OFPT STATS REPLY OpenFlow message, reporting the
packet matches and the accesses to their flow tables occurred
during the current time window. Given this information, the
SDN controller can analyze the collected statistics, and look
for possible anomalies or ongoing attacks, such as Denial of
Service (DoS) or wormhole propagation. The actual anomaly
detection process can rely on several different techniques, e.g.
machine learning [14], data mining [13], or entropy based
algorithms [11] [12].
When the SDN controller identifies traffic anomalies or
ongoing attacks, it performs mitigating actions to limit or
neutralize their impact. That is, the SDN controller sends
OFPT FLOW MOD messages to specific switches, to install
or update flows in their flow tables. Such flows and related
policies aim at blocking malicious traffic, e.g. by dropping or
caching packets that are addressed to presumed victim hosts
or coming from suspected attack sources.
C. Simulation of security attacks
Our extensions allow network designers to quantitatively
evaluate the impact and effects of security attacks against SDN
networks, i.e. how attacks affect performance indicators with
respect to the same scenario in the attack-free case. This makes
it possible to rank different attacks according to their severity,
and hence to easier select effective countermeasures to adopt.
Rather than executing security attacks by implementing their
actual performance, we reproduce their effects against the
network and applications. Evaluation of security attacks relies
on two fundamental components, i.e. a high-level Attack Spec-
ification Language and an Attack Simulation Engine, described
in Sections III-C1-III-C3.
We previously presented an earlier version of such compo-
nents as part of the INET-based attack simulation framework
SEA++ [8], and adapted their functionalities to support attack
simulation in SDN networks. Note that the approach adopted
to reproduce and evaluate security attacks is not strictly
related to SDN, i.e. it can in principle be reused for any
network architecture sopported by INET. At the same time,
our extended simulation tool makes it possible to evaluate the
impact of security attacks that specifically consider switches
as actual attack victims (e.g. injection of fake flows to install)
or compromised units contributing to the attack execution (e.g.
through packet dropping or replication). Our implementation
activity is currently focused on enabling the evaluation of such
attacks involving switches.
1) Attack description: The Attack Specification Language
(ASL) allows the user to describe attacks to be evaluated, in
terms of their final effects. That is, the user assumes that
attacks can be successfully performed, regardless how an
adversary can specifically mount and execute them. Then, the
user describes attacks as sequence of events that atomically
take place during the network simulation. To this end, the
ASL provides a collection of primitives organized into two
sets, i.e. node primitives and message primitives.
Node primitives account for physical attacks against
network nodes. A physical attack is composed by a single
node primitive. The following node primitives are available:
• destroy(nodeID, t) - Remove node ’nodeID’ from the
network at time ’t’, after which it cannot take part to network
communication any longer.
• move(nodeID, t, x, y, z) - Change the current position of
node ’nodeID’ to a new position {x,y,z} at time ’t’.
Message primitives account for cyber attacks and describe
actions on network packets. Packet fields are addressed by
means of the dot notation packet.layer.field. The following
node primitives are available:
• drop(pkt) - Discards the packet ’pkt’.
• create(pkt, fld, content, ...) - Creates a new packet ’pkt’
and fill its field ’fld’ with ’content’. It is possible to specify
the content of multiple fields through a single invocation.
• clone(srcPkt, dstPkt) - Produces a perfect copy ’dstPkt’
of the packet ’srcPkt’.
• change(pkt, fld, newContent) - Writes ’newContent’
into the field ’fld’ of packet ’pkt’.
• send(pkt, d) - Schedules the transmission of a packet ’pkt’
produced by ’clone()’ or ’create()’, after a delay ’d’.
• retrieve(pkt, fld, var) - Assigns the content of the field
’fld’ of packet ’pkt’ to the variable ’var’.
• put(pkt, dstNodes, TX | RX, updateStats, d) - Inserts the
packet ’pkt’ either in the TX or RX buffer of all nodes in the
’dstNodes’ list, after a delay ’d’.
The ASL provides statements to specify conditional attacks,
i.e. lists of events described through message primitives that
occur on a declared list of nodes if a condition is evaluated
as TRUE. That is, as a general example:
from T nodes = <list of nodes> do {
filter(<condition>) <list of events>
}
Also, it is possible to specify unconditional attacks,
i.e. list of attack events described through message
primitives, and reproduced on a periodical fashion or
upon the occurrence of specific conditions evaluated by
network nodes at runtime. For instance, the statement
from T every P do {<list of events>}
specifies that the list of events takes place periodically
on the declared list of nodes, since time T and with period P.
2) Attack Simulation Engine: After having described the
attacks to be evaluated, the user simply runs a simulation cam-
paign on the enhanced INET framework, in order to evaluate
Fig. 3: Architecture of the Attack Simulation Engine.
the impact and effects of the described attacks. To this end,
the Attack Simulation Engine (ASE) considers network nodes
as implemented by an Enchanced Network Node module. The
latter is in turn composed of: i) an Application module possibly
including different sub-modules modelling the actual node
application(s); ii) an arbitrarily complex collection of protocols
composing the communication stack; and, finally iii) a Local
Event Processor (LEP) module. Notice that all such modules
but LEP can be off-the-shelf.
The LEP module manages the attack events and operates
transparently with respect to the other components of the En-
hanced Network Node module. Specifically, the LEP module
intercepts incoming and outgoing network packets traveling
through a node’s communication stack, acting as gate-bypass
between each pair of INET modules implementing the differ-
ent communication layers. Then, depending on the considered
attacks to be evaluated, it can inspect and alter packets’
content, inject new packets, or even discard intercepted ones.
Finally, the LEP module can also alter the node’s behavior at
different layers, change its position in space, or even neutralize
the node by making it inactive.
To address the presence of multiple network nodes and
enable the simulation of complex attacks, we instantiate an
Enhanced Network Node module for each network node, and
a single Global Event Processor (GEP) module that connects
all the Enhanced Network Node modules with one another.
The GEP module is separately connected with every LEP
module, so allowing them to synchronize and communicate
with one another in order to implement more complex, possi-
bly distributed, security attacks. Finally, the LEP and GEP
modules handle packets at different communication layers
and conveniently access their header fields by means of the
OMNeT++ descriptor classes.
Figure 3 shows the overall architecture of the ASE, with
reference to two interconnected network nodes. Our exten-
sions integrate the Local Event Processor and Global Event
Processor modules highlighted in green within the INET
framework, in order to correctly manage simulation events and
network packets. This requires particular attention for the SDN
switches, to maintain the separation between the Control plane
and the Data plane, and to correctly manage the multiple MAC
interfaces (see Figure 2(b)).
Note that the ASE consists in additional components inte-
grated within the INET framework to support the processing of
attack events. That is, we do not fundamentally modify INET
as to the handling and scheduling of simulation events, and
we do not modify any of the available applications, communi-
cation protocols, or physical models. Most important, the user
is not required to implement or customize any component of
the simulation platform.
3) Injection of attack events: The attack description based
on ASL is converted into a XML configuration file by
means of a Python Attack Specification Interpreter, and then
provided as input to INET upon simulation startup. Such
configuration file is composed of three different sections, i.e
a first part listing all the specified physical attacks, a second
part listing all the specified conditional attacks, and a final
third part listing all the specified unconditional attacks. At
simulation startup, the ASE parses the XML configuration
file and proceeds as follows. For each node n involved in at
least one attack, the ASE:
• Creates one list LPn, each element of which includes the
description of one physical attack involving node n. The
list elements are cronologically ordered according to the
respective attack’s occurrence time.
• Creates one list LCn, each element of which includes the
description of one conditional attack involving node n. The
list elements are cronologically ordered according to the
respective attack’s starting time.
• Creates one list LUn, each element of which includes the
description of one unconditional attack involving node n.
The list elements are cronologically ordered according to the
respective attack’s starting time.
After that, the ASE starts a number of timers, each one
associated to a specified attack. That is, for each node n
involved in at least one attack, the ASE:
• Creates a set of attack timers TPn, each one of which
associated to one physical attack involving node n.
• Creates a set of attack timers TCn, each one of which
associated to one conditional attack involving node n.
• Creates a set of attack timers TUn, each one of which
associated to one unconditional attack involving node n.
• Starts all the timers in TPn, TCn, and TUn, in order to
schedule the respective attack’s occurrence.
Throughout the network simulation, the ASE proceeds as
follows. When an attack timer associated to a node n expires,
the ASE retrieves the associated attack A. Then:
• If A is a physical attack, the ASE executes the associated
node primitive, and removes A from the attack list LPn.
• If A is a conditional attack, from then on the ASE starts
intercepting packets flowing through node n’s communication
stack, by means of node n’s LPE. Intercepted packets are
filtered, based on the condition specified in the conditional
statement of attack A. For each packet that satisfies the
conditional statement, the ASE executes the list of events
described by the message primitives in A. The execution of
some node primitives may involve also the GEP as well as the
LEP modules of other nodes than n.
• If A is an unconditional attack, from then on the ASE starts
executing the corresponding list of message primitives, and
repeatedly performs A according to the occurrence frequency
in the attack description. The GEP is responsible for starting
the actual reproduction of uncondintional attacks.
IV. EVALUATION OF A DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK
In this section, we simulate a simple Denial of Service
attack against a server host, and present some preliminary
results. We refer to the scenario in Figure 4, which includes:
i) a SDN controller and a switch; and ii) four client hosts and
three server hosts, running a UDP application. Besides, Client1
sends 10 packets per second to Server1; Client2 and Client3
send 5 and 3.33 packets per second to Server2, respectively;
Client4 sends 5 packets per second to Server3.
Each flow installed on the switch expires every 30 seconds.
When this happens, the switch notifies the SDN controller,
removes the flow and possibly re-establishes it upon receiving
new packets from/to the involved host(s). The SDN controller
periodically collects flow statistics from the switch, according
to a configurable interval I . Besides, the SDN controller
runs a monitoring application that analyzes flow statistics
in order to detect possible traffic anomalies. In particular, it
relies on: i) entropy-based techniques for anomaly detection
[11] [12]; and ii) bounded rates for transmission/reception of
packets on a single-node basis. If traffic anomalies are detected
on a given flow, the SDN controller sends an OpenFlow
message OFPT FLOW MOD to the switch, in order to install
a selective drop policy and discard all packets matching with
that flow until further notice. In this scenario, we consider
an adversary that has compromised Client3, and exploits it to
transmit additional network packets to Server2, starting from
time t = 90 s, and according to a packet injection rate R.
Figures 5 and 6 show the packet reception on Server2,
considering the attack-free case “No attack” as baseline. A
value plotted at second t = s indicates the number of packets
overall received by Server2 during the last second, i.e. between
t = s − 1 and t = s. Specifically, Figure 5 considers
Fig. 4: Evaluated SDN network scenario.
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Fig. 5: Packet reception on Server2 (I=30 s).
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Fig. 6: Packet reception on Server2 (R=40 pkts/s).
different injection rates R, and shows that the greater R
the more (attack) packets are received by Server2, until the
traffic anomaly is mitigated at t = 120 s. From then on, the
switch discards all packets coming from Client3 and addressed
to Server2. Figure 6 considers different statistic collection
intervals I , and shows the different times that it takes to detect
and mitigate the attack, depending on the interval I considered
by the SDN controller.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented our extensions to the INET framework
to support the evaluation of performance and security attacks
in SDN scenarios. Our extensions allow the user to evaluate
performance of a SDN architecture, assess accuracy and reac-
tiveness of SDN-based monitoring systems, and quantitatively
evaluate the impact of security attacks. We have evaluated a
simple Denial of Service attack, and presented preliminary
results. This work is an ongoing research activity, and we
plan to propose it for an official contribution to the INET
framework. Future work will focus on evaluating different
classes of security attacks, considering different SDN-based
monitoring systems and adversary models.
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